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ABSTRACT
Discrimination via algorithmic decisionmaking has received consid-
erable attention. Prior work largely focuses on defining conditions
for fairness, but does not define satisfactory measures of algorith-
mic unfairness. In this paper, we focus on the following question:
Given two unfair algorithms, how should we determine which of
the two is more unfair? Our core idea is to use existing inequality
indices from economics to measure how unequally the outcomes of
an algorithm benefit different individuals or groups in a population.
Our work offers a justified and general framework to compare and
contrast the (un)fairness of algorithmic predictors. This unifying
approach enables us to quantify unfairness both at the individual
and the group level. Further, our work reveals overlooked tradeoffs
between different fairness notions: using our proposed measures,
the overall individual-level unfairness of an algorithm can be decom-
posed into a between-group and a within-group component. Earlier
methods are typically designed to tackle only between-group un-
fairness, which may be justified for legal or other reasons. However,
we demonstrate that minimizing exclusively the between-group
component may, in fact, increase the within-group, and hence the
overall unfairness. We characterize and illustrate the tradeoffs be-
tween our measures of (un)fairness and the prediction accuracy.
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1 INTRODUCTION
As algorithmic decision making systems are increasingly used in
life-affecting scenarios such as criminal risk prediction [2, 6] and
credit risk assessments [15], concerns have risen about the potential
unfairness of these decisions to certain social groups or individu-
als [4, 32, 33]. In response, a number of recent works have proposed
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learning mechanisms for fair decision making by imposing addi-
tional constraints or conditions [12, 13, 17, 18, 40, 41].
In this paper, we focus on a simple yet foundational question
about unfairness of algorithms: Given two unfair algorithms, how
should we determine which of the two is more unfair? Prior works on
algorithmic fairness largely focus on formally defining conditions for
fairness, but do not precisely define suitablemeasures for unfairness.
That is, they can answer the binary question: is an algorithm fair or
unfair?, but do not have a principled way to answer the nuanced
question: if an algorithm is unfair, how unfair is it?
Figure 1 illustrates the questions we seek to answer through
an example of two binary classifiers C1 and C2, whose decisions
affect 10 individuals belonging to 3 different groups. The figure
shows that both C1 and C2 yield unequal false positive/negative
rates across the 3 groups and are thus unfair at the level of groups—
which set of unequal false positive/negative rates (C1’s or C2’s)
are more unfair? Similarly, both C1 and C2 violate our individual-
level fairness condition for “treating individuals deserving similar
outcomes similarly”, but do so in different ways—whose violation
of our individual fairness condition is more unfair?
We argue that howwe address the unfairness measurement ques-
tion has significant practical consequences. First, several studies
have observed that satisfying multiple fairness conditions at the
same time is infeasible [7, 9, 22, 23]. Hence in practice, designers
often need to select the least unfair algorithm from a feasible set
of unfair algorithms. Second, when training fair learning models,
practitioners face a tradeoff between accuracy and fairness [14, 23].
These tradeoffs rely on model-specific fairness measures (i.e., prox-
ies chosen for computational tractability) that do not generalize
across different models. Consequently, they cannot be used to com-
pare accuracy-unfairness tradeoffs of models trained using different
fair learning algorithms. Finally, designers of fair learning models
make a number of ad hoc or implicit choices about fairness measures
without explicit justification; for instance, it is unclear why in many
previous works [12, 17, 40, 41], the relative sizes of the groups in
the population are not considered in estimating unfairness—even
though these quantities matter when estimating accuracy.
In this paper, we propose to quantify unfairness using inequal-
ity indices that have been extensively studied in economics and
social welfare [3, 10, 19]. Traditionally, inequality indices such as
Coefficient of Variation [1], Gini [5, 16], Atkinson [3], Hoover [29],
and Theil [39], have been proposed to quantify how unequally in-
comes are distributed across individuals and groups in a population.
Our interest in using these indices is rooted in the well-justified
axiomatic basis for their designs. Specifically, we argue that many
axioms satisfied by inequality indices such as anonymity, population
invariance, progressive transfer preference, and subgroup decompos-
ability are appealing properties for unfairness measures to satisfy.
Thus, inequality indices are naturally well-suited as measures for
algorithmic unfairness.
Our core idea is to use existing inequality indices in order to mea-
sure how unequally the outcomes of an algorithm benefit different
individuals or groups in a population. This requires us to define a
benefit function that maps the algorithmic output for each individ-
ual to a non-negative real number. By adapting the benefit function
according to the desired fairness condition, we show that inequality
indices can be applied generally to quantify unfairness across all the
proposed fairness conditions shown in Figure 2. Since we quantify
inequality of algorithmic outcomes, our measure is independent
of the specifics of any learning model and can be used to compare
unfairness of different algorithms.
We consider a family of inequality indices called generalized
entropy indices, which includes Coefficient of Variation and Theil
index as special cases. Generalized entropy indices have a useful
property called subgroup decomposability. For any division of the
population into a set of non-overlapping groups, the property guar-
antees that our unfairness measure over the entire population can
be decomposed as the sum of a between-group unfairness compo-
nent (computed imagining that all individuals in a group receive
the group’s mean benefit) and awithin-group unfairness component
(computed as a weighted sum of inequality in benefits received by
individuals within each group). Thus, inequality indices not only
offer a unifying approach to quantifying unfairness at the levels of
both individuals and groups, but they also reveal previously over-
looked tradeoffs between individual-level and group-level fairness.
Further, the decomposition enables us to: (i) quantify how un-
fair an algorithm is along various sensitive attribute-based groups
within a population (e.g., groups based on race, gender or age) and
(ii) account for the “gerrymandered” unfairness affecting structured
subgroups constructed from “intersecting” the sensitive attribute-
groups (e.g., groups like young white women or old black men)
[22]. Our empirical evaluations show that existing fair learning
methods [17, 40], while successful in eliminating between-group
unfairness, (a) may be targeting only a small fraction of the overall
unfairness in the decision making algorithms and (b) can result in
an increase in within-group unfairness, which paradoxically can
lead to training algorithms whose overall unfairness is worse than
those trained using traditional learning methods.
To summarize the contributions of this paper: (i) we propose
inequality-indices based unfairness measures that offer a justified
and generalizable framework to compare the fairness of a variety
of algorithmic predictors against one another, (ii) we theoretically
characterize and empirically illustrate the tradeoffs between indi-
vidual fairness when measured using inequality indices and the
prediction accuracy, and (iii) we study the relationship between
individual- and group-level unfairness, showing that recently pro-
posed learning mechanisms for mitigating (between-)group unfair-
ness can lead to high within-group unfairness and consequently,
high individual unfairness.
2 MEASURING ALGORITHMIC UNFAIRNESS
VIA INEQUALITY INDICES
We first formally describe the setup of a fairness-aware machine
learning task; then proceed to show that by defining an appropriate
Individuals i1 i2 i3 i4 i5 i6 i7 i8 i9 i10
Groups д1 д1 д2 д2 д2 д2 д3 д3 д3 д3
True Labels 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1
Predicted
Labels
C1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0
C2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
C1 C2
g1 g2 g3 Fair? g1 g2 g3 Fair?
FPR 0.00 0.67 0.00 ✗ 1.00 0.33 1.00 ✗
FNR 0.00 1.00 0.33 ✗ 1.00 1.00 0.33 ✗
FDR 0.00 1.00 0.00 ✗ 1.00 1.00 0.33 ✗
FOR 0.00 0.50 0.50 ✗ 1.00 0.33 1.00 ✗
AR 0.50 0.50 0.50 ✓ 0.50 0.25 0.75 ✗
Acc. 1.00 0.25 0.75 ✗ 0.00 0.50 0.50 ✗
Individual Fairness Rejects
2
5 deserving users
Accepts 25 undeserving users
Rejects 35 deserving users
Accepts 35 undeserving users
Figure 1: [Top] A set of ten users along with their true labels,
y ∈ {0, 1}, and predicted labels, yˆ ∈ {0, 1}, by two classifiers C1
and C2. Label 1 represents a more desirable outcome (e.g., receiving
a loan) than label 0. The users belong to three different groups: д1
(red), д2 (green), and д3 (blue). [Bottom] Fairness of the classifiers ac-
cording to various group- and individual-level metrics. The group-
level metrics are false positive rate (FPR), false negative rate (FNR),
false discovery rate (FDR), false omission rate (FOR), acceptance
rate in desirable class (AR), accuracy (Acc.), while our individual-
level metric requires individuals deserving similar outcomes (i.e.,
with similar true lables) to receive similar outcomes (i.e., receive
similar predicted labels). The table also shows information about
whether the classifier is fair w.r.t. the corresponding conditions or
not. The fairness conditions are described in detail in Figure 2. We
note that while both C1 and C2 are individually unfair according to
our unfairness measure (with benefits defined as in Eq. 1 and Gen-
eralized Entropy in Eq. 2 used with α = 2), the unfairness of C1 is 0.2
whereas the unfairness of C2 is 0.3. Hence, C2 is more individually
unfair than C1. One can similarly quantify and compare unfairness
based on other fairness notions described in Figure 2.
benefit function, existing inequality indices can be applied across
the board to quantify algorithmic unfairness.We describe important
properties (axioms) which we suggest a reasonable measure of algo-
rithmic unfairness must satisfy. We end this section by comparing
our proposed approach with previous work.
2.1 Setting
We consider the standard supervised learning setting: A learning
algorithm receives a training data set D = {(xi ,yi )}ni=1 consisting
of n instances, where xi ∈ X specifies the feature vector1 for an
individual i (e.g., xi could consist of individual i’s age, gender, and
previous number of arrests in a criminal risk prediction task) and
yi ∈ Y is the outcome for this individual (e.g., whether or not they
commit a bail violation). Unless specified otherwise, we assume
X ⊆ RM , whereM denotes the number of features. IfY is a finite set
of labels (e.g., Y = {0, 1}), the learning task is called classification;
if Y is continuous (i.e., Y = R), it is called regression. In this
paper, we will focus on binary classification, but our work extends
to multiclass classification and regression, as well.
We assume certain features (e.g., gender or race) are considered
sensitive. Sensitive features specify an individual’s membership in
1Throughout the paper, we use boldface notation to indicate a vector.
Fairness Fairness Benefit Function
Notion Condition TP TN FP FN
Group
Fairness
Parity Mistreatment
Accuracy Equal accuracy for all groups 1 1 0 0
Equal Opportunity Equal FPR for all groups n/a 1 0 n/aEqual FNR for all groups 1 n/a n/a 0
Well-calibration Equal FDR for all groups 1 n/a 0 n/aEqual FOR for all groups n/a 1 n/a 0
Parity Impact / Statistical Parity Equal acceptance rate for all groups 1 0 1 0
Individual
Fairness Our proposal
Individuals deserving similar
outcomes receive similar outcomes 1 1 2 0
Figure 2: A summary of different fairness notions and their corresponding fairness conditions. We also show a benefit function that we use
to compute inequality under each of the fairness conditions. Since all outcomes of a classifier can be decomposed into true positives (TP), true
negatives (TN), false positives (FP) and false negatives (FN), the benefit function needs to assign a benefit score to each of these prediction
types under any given fairness notion. For example, under statistical parity, which requires equal acceptance rates for all groups, we assign
a benefit of “1” to TP and FP, and a benefit of “0” to TN and FN. “n/a” under an entry shows that these points are not considered under the
corresponding fairness notion (e.g., equality of FPR requires considering only the points with negative true labels, i.e., y = 1).
socially salient groups (e.g., women or African-Americans). For sim-
plicity of exposition, we assume there is just one sensitive feature.
However, the discussion can be extended to account for multiple
sensitive features. We denote the sensitive feature for each individ-
ual i as zi ∈ Z = {1, 2, . . . ,K}. Note that zi may or may not be part
of the feature vector xi . One can define partitions of the dataset D
based on the sensitive feature, that is, Dz = {(xi ,yi ) | zi = z}. We
refer to each partition Dz of the data as a sensitive feature group.
The goal of a learning algorithm is to use the training data
to fit a model (or hypothesis) that accurately predicts the label
for a new instance. A model θ : X → Y receives the feature
vector corresponding to a new individual and makes a prediction
about his/her label. Let Θ be the hypothesis class consisting of
all the models from which the learning algorithm can choose. A
learning algorithm receives D as the input; then utilizes the data
to select a model θ ∈ Θ that minimizes some notion of loss. For
instance, in classification the (0-1) loss of a model θ on the training
data D is defined as L(θ ) = ∑ni=1 |yi − yˆi | where yˆi = θ (xi ). The
learning algorithm outputs θ∗ ∈ Θ that minimizes the loss, i.e.,
θ∗ = argminL(θ ).
2.2 Unfairness as Inequality in Benefits
The core idea of our proposal is to quantify the unfairness of an
algorithm by measuring how unequally the outcomes of the algo-
rithm benefit different individuals or groups in a population. While
intuitive, our proposal raises two key questions: (i) how should we
map algorithmic predictions received by individuals or groups to
benefits? and (ii) given a set of benefits received by individuals
or groups, how should we quantify inequality in the benefit dis-
tribution? We now tackle the first question, related to defining a
benefit function for an individual given an outcome. In Section 2.3,
we propose inequality indices as the answer to the second question.
Our choice of the benefit function will be dictated by the type
of fairness notion we wish to apply on the task at hand. Figure 2
summarizes the different fairness notions that have been defined
in prior works and their corresponding benefit functions. We now
explain the choice of our benefit functions for the different fairness
notions in the context of binary classification. Formally, let yi ∈
Y = {0, 1} indicate the true label for individual i . We assume
that labels in the training data reflect ground truth, and thus, yi is
the label deserved by individual i . Let yˆi ∈ {0, 1} be the label the
algorithm assigns to individual i .
Intuitively, the algorithmic benefit an individual i receives, bi ,
should capture the desirability of outcome yˆi for the individual.
The desirability of an individual’s outcome may be determined
taking into account the individual’s own preferences or the broader
societal good. For instance, consider the criminal risk prediction
example, where the positive label (yˆ = 1) indicates a low risk of
criminal behavior and the negative label (yˆ = 0) indicates a high risk
of criminal behavior. An individual defendant would clearly prefer
the former outcome over the latter. However, from a social good
perspective, accurate outcomes (yˆ = y) would be more desirable
than inaccurate outcomes. Furthermore, amongst the inaccurate
outcomes, one might wish to distinguish between the desirability
of false positives (where a high risk person is released) and false
negatives (where an low risk person is withheld).
In our binary classification scenario, where all outcomes can
be decomposed into true positives (yˆ = 1,y = 1), true negatives
(yˆ = 0,y = 0), false positives (yˆ = 1,y = 0), and false negatives (yˆ =
0,y = 1), the choice of our benefit function crucially determines
the relative desirability of these different types of outcomes and
captures different notions of fairness. For instance, the notion of
parity mistreatment considers accurate outcomes as more desirable
than inaccurate ones – so we choose a benefit function that assigns
higher value (bi = 1) to true positives and true negatives and a lower
value (bi = 0) to false positives and false negatives. In contrast,
the notion of parity impact considers a positive label outcome as
more desirable than a negative label outcome – so we adapt the
benefit function to assign higher value (bi = 1) to true positives
and false positives and a lower value (bi = 0) to true negatives
and false negatives. To capture group fairness, once we define the
benefits for all individuals, b = (b1, · · · ,bn ), we can define the
benefit for a subset/group д of the population, denoted by µд , as
the mean value of the benefits received by individuals in the group:
µд =
1
|д |
∑
i ∈д bi .
To capture individual fairness, we propose defining the benefit
function of an individual i as the discrepancy between i’s preference
for the outcome i truly deserves (i.e., yi ), and i’s preference for the
outcome the learning algorithm assigns (i.e., yˆi ). As an illustration,
in this work we consider a benefit function that assigns the highest
value (bi = 2) for false positives (i.e., individuals that receive the
advantageous positive label undeservedly), moderate values (bi = 1)
for true positives and true negatives (i.e., individuals that receive
the labels they deserve) and lowest value (bi = 0) for false negatives
(i.e., individuals that receive the disadvantageous negative label
despite deserving the positive label). More precisely, we compute
the benefit for individual i as follows:
bi = yˆi − yi + 1. (1)
We make two observations about the values of the benefit func-
tions for different types of outcomes. First, while different fairness
notions specify a preference ordering for different types of out-
comes (i.e., true positives, false positives, true negatives, and false
negatives), the absolute benefit values could be specified differently.
The choice of benefit values would depend on the context and task
at hand and the difficulty of determining them may vary in practice.
Second, as many existing measures of inequality in benefits are
limited to handling non-negative values, we need to ensure that
bi ≥ 0 for i = 1, · · · ,n and that there exists j ∈ [n] such that bj > 0.
Our proposal is to measure the overall individual-level unfairness
of an algorithm by plugging bi ’s (as defined above) into an exist-
ing inequality index (such as generalized entropy—to be defined
shortly). Throughout the rest of the paper, we will use the terms
“overall unfairness” and “individual unfairness” interchangeably,
to refer to our proposed measure. Our approach can be further
generalized to measuring (un)fairness beyond supervised learning
tasks (e.g. for unsupervised tasks, such as clustering or ranking)—
this only requires the specification a proper notion of benefit for
individuals given their relative outcomes within the population. We
leave a careful exploration of this direction for future, and focus on
supervised learning tasks in the current work.
Next, we discuss howwe can generally quantify the unfairness of
an algorithm as the degree to which it distributes benefit unequally
across individuals using inequality indices.
2.3 Axioms for Measuring Inequality
Borrowing insights from the rich body of work on the axiomatic
characterization of inequality indices in economics and social sci-
ence [3, 10, 19, 24, 25, 28, 34], we argue that many axioms satisfied
by inequality indices are appealing properties for measures of al-
gorithmic unfairness. Therefore, inequality indices are naturally
well-suited as measures for algorithmic unfairness. In this section,
we briefly overview these axioms.
Suppose society consists of n individuals, where bi ≥ 0 denotes
the benefit individual i receives as the result of being subject to algo-
rithmic decision making. An inequality measure, I :
⋃∞
n=1 R
n
≥0 →
R≥0, maps any benefit distribution/vector b to a non-negative real
number I (b). A benefit vector b is considered less unfair (i.e., more
fair) than b′ if and only if I (b) < I (b′).
Many inequality indices previously studied satisfy the following
four principles:
• Anonymity: The measure does not depend on any charac-
teristics of the individuals other than their benefit, and is
independent of who earns each level of benefit. Formally:
I (b1,b2, · · · ,bn ) = I
(
b(1),b(2), · · · ,b(n)
)
,
b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 b7 b8 b9 b10
1 1 1 2 0 0 1 1 1 2
Overall individual-level unfairness = I (b1, . . . ,b10)
µд1 µд1 µд2 µд2 µд2 µд2 µд3 µд3 µд3 µд3
1 1 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25
Between-group unfairness
= I (µд1 , µд1 ,µд2 , µд2 , µд2 , µд2 ,µд3 , µд3 , µд3 , µд3 )
b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 b7 b8 b9 b10
0 2 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 2
Within-group unf. Within-group unf. Within-group unf.
=I (b1,b2) =I (b3,b4,b5,b6) =I (b7,b8,b9,b10)
Figure 3: The set of ten users along with the benefit that each
user receives from classifier C1 in Figure 1. The overall individual-
level unfairness of the classifier can be computed as the inequality
I over the benefits received by the users. Overall unfairness can be
decomposed into two components: 1) between-group unfairness is
computed as the inequality between (weighted) average group ben-
efits for a given group, and 2) within-group unfairness which is a
weighted sum of within-group inequality.
where (b(1),b(2), . . . ,b(n)) is the benefit vector (b1,b2, · · · ,bn )
sorted in ascending order.
• Population invariance: The measure is independent of the
size of the population under consideration. More precisely,
let b′ = ⟨b, · · · , b⟩ ∈ Rnk≥0 be a k-replication of b. Then
I (b) = I (b′).
• Transfer principle:Transferring benefit from a high-benefit
to a low-benefit individual must decrease inequality. More
precisely for any 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n and 0 < δ < b(j )−b(i )2 ,
I (b(1), · · · ,b(i) + δ , · · · ,b(j) − δ , · · · ,b(n)) < I (b).
Note that the transfer should not reverse the relative posi-
tion of the two individuals i and j. The transfer principle is
sometimes called the Pigou-Dalton principle [11, 31].
• Zero-Normalization: The measure is minimized when ev-
ery individual receives the same level of benefit. That is, for
any b ∈ R≥0, I (b,b, · · · ,b) = 0.
In addition to the above four principles satisfied by many in-
equality indices, we also focus on the following property which
is important for our purposes. Subgroup decomposability is a
structural property of some inequality measures requiring that for
any partition G of the population into groups, the measure, I (b),
can be expressed as the sum of a “between-group component" IGβ (b)
(computed by assigning to each person in a subgroup д ∈ G the
subgroup’s mean benefit µд ) and a “within-group component" IGω (b)
(a weighted sum of subgroup inequality levels): 2
I (b) = Iβ (b) + Iω (b).
See Figure 3 for an illustration of this property.
While not all inequality measures satisfy the decomposability
property (e.g., the Gini Index does not), the property has been stud-
ied extensively in economics, as it allows economists to compare
patterns and dynamics of inequality in different subpopulations
(e.g., racial minorities [8]).
2When the partition G we are referring to is clear from the context, we drop the
superscript G to simplify notation.
Our measure of unfairness. For quantifying algorithmic unfair-
ness, in this paper, we focus on a family of inequality indices called
generalized entropy indices. For a constant α < {0, 1}, the gener-
alized entropy of benefits b1,b2, · · · ,bn with mean benefit µ is
defined as follows:
Eα (b1,b2, · · · ,bn ) = 1
nα(α − 1)
n∑
i=1
[(
bi
µ
)α
− 1
]
. (2)
One can interpret generalized entropy as a measure of informa-
tion theoretic redundancy in data. Generalized entropy satisfies
the earlier properties of anonymity, population-invariance, the
Pigou-Dalton transfer principle, and zero-normalization. Further it
is subgroup decomposable [10], and also scale-invariant.3 In fact,
Shorrocks [35] show that generalized entropy is the only differ-
entiable family of inequality indices that satisfies population- and
scale-invariance. Our interest in this family of inequality indices
is motivated by this result and by our aim of understanding the
trade-offs between individual and group-level unfairness.
2.4 Comparison with Previous Work
Existing notions of algorithmic fairness can be divided into two
distinct categories: group and individual fairness.
Group fairness. Group fairness notions require that given a classi-
fier θ , a certain group-conditional quality metric qz (θ ) is the same
for all sensitive feature groups. That is:
qz (θ ) = qz′(θ ) ∀z, z′ ∈ Z.
Different choices for qz (.) have led to different namings of the corre-
sponding group fairness notions (see e.g., statistical parity [9, 12, 23],
disparate impact [13, 41], equality of opportunity [17], calibra-
tion [23], and disparate mistreatment [40]). Generally, these no-
tions cannot guarantee fairness at the individual level, or when
groups are further refined (see Kearns et al. [22] for an illustrative
example).
Existing group fairness notions are similar to the between-group
component of fairness that we propose. However, these notions
usually do not take into account the size of different groups, whereas
our between-group measure considers the proportion of the groups
relative to the total population as illustrated in Figure 3. For example
consider a population divided into two groups A and B containing
70% and 30% of the population with the negative ground truth label
respectively. Using generalized entropy with α = 2, a classifier C1
achieving a false positive rate of 0.8 onA and 0.6 on B has a between-
group inequality of 0.06, whereas a classifier C2 with false positive
rates of 0.6 on A and 0.8 on B results in a lower between-group
inequality of 0.04. However, when considering a group fairness
measure based on differences in false positive rates between A and
B, C1 and C2 would be equally fair.
Individual fairness. Dwork et al. [12] first formalized the notion
of individual fairness for classification tasks using Lipschitz condi-
tions on the classifier outcomes. Their notion of individual fairness
requires that two individuals who are similar with respect to the
task at hand, receive similar classification outcomes. Dwork et al.’s
definition is, therefore, formalized in terms of a similarity function
3A measure I is scale-invariant if for any constant c > 0, I (cb) = I (b).
between individuals. For instance, in practice given two individ-
uals with feature values x and x′, and suitable distance functions
DX and DY (defined over X × X and ∆(Y) × ∆(Y), respectively),
Dwork et al.’s notion for individual fairness requires the following
condition to hold:
DY
(
p(yˆ = 1|x),p(yˆ = 1|x′)) < DX(x, x′).
Due to its dependence on the individual feature vectors x, Dwork
et al.’s notion of individual fairness does not satisfy the anonymity
principle.
Furthermore, Dwork et al.’s notion of individual fairness only pro-
vides a ‘yes/no’ answer to whether fairness conditions are satisfied,
but does not provide a meaningful measure of algorithmic fairness
when considered independent of prediction accuracy. We further
illustrate this point with two examples: First, by this definition a
model that assigns the same outcome to everyone is considered fair,
regardless of people’s merit for different outcomes (e.g. awarding
pretrial release to every defendant is considered fair, even though
only some of them—those who appear for subsequent hearings and
don’t commit a crime4—deserve to be awarded the pretrial release).
Second, the definition does not take into account the difference in
social desirability of various outcomes. For instance, if one flips the
(binary) labels predicted by a fair classifier, the resulting classifier
will be considered equally fair (e.g. a classifier that awards pretrial
release to a defendant if and only if they go on to violate the release
criteria is considered fair!). The measure we propose in equations 1
and 2 addresses these issues by offering a merit-based metric of
fairness that seeks to equalize the benefit individuals receive as the
result of being subject to algorithmic decision making.
Finally, we remark that there has been interest in a similar
axiomatic approach to methods for algorithmic interpretability
[30, 38].
3 THEORETICAL CHARACTERIZATION
In this section, we characterize the conditions under which there
is a tradeoff between accuracy and our notion of algorithmic fair-
ness. Further, we shed light on the relationship between our notion
of fairness and existing group measures, precisely connecting the
two when the inequality index in use is additively decomposable
(see [36] and the references therein). At a high level, we show that
group unfairness is one piece of a larger puzzle: overall unfairness
may be regarded as a combination of unfairness within- and be-
tween-groups. As the number of groupings increases, with each
becoming smaller (eventually becoming single individuals), the
between-group component grows to be an increasingly large part
of the overall unfairness.
3.1 Accuracy vs. Individual Fairness
We begin by observing that the fairness optimal classifier is per-
fectly fair if and only if the accuracy optimal classifier is per-
fectly accurate. Given a classifier θ and training data set D =
{(xi ,yi )}ni=1, let ID (θ ) specify the individual unfairness of θ on D,
that is, ID (θ ) = I (bθ1 , · · · ,bθn ) where bθi = 1 + θ (xi ) − yi . LD (θ ) is
the empirical loss of θ on D.
4For making the pretrial release decisions, these two are the main criteria that the
judges or the algorithms try to assess [6, 37].
Proposition 3.1. Suppose I (.) is a zero-normalized inequality
index and Θ is closed under complements.5 For any training data set
D, there exists a classifier θ ∈ Θ for which ID (θ ) = 0 if and only if
there exists a classifier θ ′ for which LD (θ ′) = 0. 6
Proposition 3.1 may seem to suggest that our notion of fairness
is entirely in harmony with prediction accuracy: by simply mini-
mizing prediction error, unfairness will be automatically eliminated.
While this is true in the special case of fully separable data (or when
we have access to an oracle with 0 prediction error), it is not true
in general. The following result shows that under broad conditions,
the fairness optimal classifier may not coincide with the accuracy
optimal classifier. For training data set D, let θAD be the accuracy
optimal classifier, and θ FD be the fairness optimal classifier:
θAD = argminθ
LD (θ ) and θ FD = argminθ ID (θ ).
Proposition 3.2. Suppose I (.) satisfies the transfer principle and
is population- and scale-invariant. If there exists a feature vector x˜
such that 0 < P[y = 1|x = x˜] < 0.5, then there exists a training data
set D for which θBD . θ FD .
Even though the fairness optimal and accuracy optimal classi-
fiers do not necessarily coincide, one might wonder if the fairness
optimal classifier always results in near-optimal accuracy. In fact,
it does not. Example A.1 in the appendix shows that the accuracy
of the fairness optimal classifier can be arbitrarily worse than that
of the accuracy optimal classifier.
3.2 Individual vs. Group Fairness
Next, we focus on additive-decomposability and show how this
property allows us to establish formally the existence of trade-
offs between individual- and group-level (un)fairness. Suppose we
partition the population into |G | disjoint subgroups, where sub-
group д ∈ G consists of nд individuals with the benefit vector
bд = (bд1 , · · · ,b
д
nд ) and mean benefit µд . Each partition could, for
instance, correspond to a sensitive feature group (e.g.,д = 1 consists
of all African-American defendants and д = 2, all white defendants).
One can re-write the Generalized Entropy as follows:
Eα (b1, b2, · · · , bn ) =
|G |∑
д=1
nд
n
(
µд
µ
)α
Eα (bд )
+
|G |∑
д=1
nд
nα (α − 1)
[(
µд
µ
)α
− 1
]
= Eαω (b) + Eαβ (b).
Note that imposing a constraint on a decomposable inequality mea-
sure, such as Eα (b), guarantees both within-group and between-
group inequality are bounded. Existing notions of group fairness,
however, capture only the between-group component (when |G | = 2,
the between-group unfairness is minimized if and only if the two
groups receive the same treatment on average). The problem with
imposing a constraint on the between-group component (Eαβ (b))
alone, is that it may drive up the within-group component, Eαω (b).
In fact, we show that if an individual-fairness optimal classifier
5In the context of a binary classification task with Y = {0, 1}, Θ is closed under
complements if for any θ ∈ Θ, also 1 − θ ∈ Θ.
6Proofs can be found in the appendix.
is not group-fairness optimal, then optimizing for group fairness
alone will certainly increase unfairness within groups sufficiently
so as to raise the overall (individual) unfairness.
Formally, minimizing our notion of individual unfairness while
guaranteeing a certain level of accuracy corresponds to the follow-
ing optimization:7
min
θ ∈Θ
Iβ (θ ) + Iω (θ ) s.t. L(θ ) ≥ δ , (3)
while minimizing only between-group unfairness corresponds to:
min
θ ∈Θ
Iβ (θ ) s.t. L(θ ) ≥ δ . (4)
Let θ∗(δ ) be an optimal solution for optimization (3)—if there are
multiple optimal solutions, pick one with the lowest Iβ . Let θ∗β (δ )
be any optimal solution for optimization (4). The following holds.
Proposition 3.3. Suppose I (.) is additively decomposable. For any
δ ∈ [0, 1], if Iβ
(
θ∗β (δ )
)
, Iβ (θ∗(δ )), then Iω
(
θ∗β (δ )
)
> Iω (θ∗(δ ))
and I
(
θ∗β (δ )
)
> I (θ∗(δ )).
Next, we show that the contribution of the between-group com-
ponent to overall inequality, i.e. Iβ /I , depends—among other things—
on the granularity of the groups. In particular, the between-group
contribution increases with intersectionality: Iβ is lower when
computed over just race (African-Americans vs. Caucasians), and
is higher when computed over the intersection of race and gender
(female African-Americans, . . . , male Caucasians). More precisely,
suppose G,G ′ are two partitions of the population into disjoint
groups. Let G ×G ′ specify the Cartesian product of the two parti-
tions: for д ∈ G,д′ ∈ G ′, i ∈ (д,д′) if and only if i ∈ д and i ∈ д′. It
is easy to show the following result.
Proposition 3.4. Suppose I (.) is zero-normalized and additively
decomposable. Suppose G,G ′ are two different partitions of the pop-
ulation into disjoint groups. For any benefit distribution b, IGβ (b) ≤
IG×G′β (b).
If one continues refining the groups, eventually every individ-
ual will be in their own group and the between-group unfairness
becomes equivalent to the overall individual unfairness. This offers
a framework to interpolate between group and individual fairness.
When the number of groups is small and people within each
group receive highly unequal benefits, the contribution of the
between-group component to overall unfairness is small, and nar-
rowing down attention to reducing Iβ alone may result in fairness
gerrymandering [22]: while it is often easy to reduce group un-
fairness in this case, doing so will affect the overall unfairness in
unpredictable ways—potentially making the within-group unfair-
ness worse. On the other hand, as the number of groups increases
or the treatment of people within a group becomes more uniform,
the role that the between-group component plays in overall unfair-
ness grows – but, as noted by Kearns et al. [22], it also becomes
computationally harder to control and limit the between-group
unfairness.
Proposition 3.5. Suppose I (.) is zero-normalized and additively
decomposable. Suppose I (b) , 0. For any partitionG of the population
7For simplicity, we are dropping the training data set D from the subscripts.
to disjoint subgroups, 0 ≤ I
G
β (b)
I (b) ≤ 1. Further, there exist benefit
distributions b and b′ such that
IGβ (b)
I (b) = 1 and
IGβ (b′)
I (b′) = 0.
Implication for practitioners: individual or group unfairness? We
saw that the contribution of the group component to overall un-
fairness is a nuanced function of the granularity with which the
groups are defined, as well as the unfairness within each group.
If our goal is to reduce overall unfairness, note that existing fair
learning models that exclusively focus on reducing between-group
unfairness would help only when between-group accounts for a
large part of the overall unfairness. Our measures of unfairness
present a framework to examine this condition.
4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we empirically validate our theoretical proposi-
tions from Section 3 on multiple real-world datasets. Specifically,
in Section 4.1, our goal is to shed light on tradeoffs between overall
individual-level unfairness and accuracy. In Section 4.2, we explore
how the overall unfairness decomposes along the lines of sensitive
attribute groups. We use the subgroup-decomposability of our pro-
posed unfairness measures to study finer-grained fairness-accuracy
tradeoffs at the levels of between-group and within-group unfair-
ness. In Section 4.3, we empirically explore how methods to control
between-group unfairness affect other unfairness components.
Setup and Datasets. We use the Generalized Entropy index (cf.
Eq. 2) with α = 2 (in other words, half the squared coefficient of
variation) to measure unfairness:
E2(b1,b2, · · · ,bn ) = 12 × n
n∑
i=1
[(
bi
µ
)2
− 1
]
.
As noted in Section 2, the Generalized Entropy index can be further
decomposed into between-group and within-group unfairness as:
E2(b1,b2, · · · ,bn ) = E2ω (b) + E2β (b). (5)
We will refer to the quantity E2 as individual unfairness or overall
unfairness interchangeably, E2β as between-group unfairness, and
E2ω as within-group unfairness.
We experiment with two real-world datasets: (i) the Adult income
dataset [27], and (ii) the ProPublica COMPAS dataset [26]. Both
datasets have received previous attention [9, 13, 40–42].
For the Adult income dataset, the task is to predict whether an
individual earns more (positive class) or less (negative class) than
50,000 USD per year based on features like education level and
occupation. We consider gender (female and male) and race (Black,
White and Asian) as sensitive features.We filter out races (American
Indian and Other) which constitute less than 1% of the dataset. After
the filtering, the dataset consists of 44, 434 subjects and 11 features.
For the ProPublica COMPAS dataset, the task is to predict whether
(negative class) or not (positive class) a criminal defendant would
commit a crime within two years based on features like current
charge degree or number of prior offenses. We use the same set of
features as Zafar et al. [40]. The sensitive features in this case are
also gender (female and male) and race (Black, Hispanic, White).
The dataset consists of 5, 786 subjects and 5 features.
For all experiments, we repeatedly split the data into 70%-30%
train-test sets 10 times and report average statistics. All hyperpa-
rameters are validated using a further 70%-30% split of the train set
into train and validation sets.
4.1 Fairness vs. Accuracy Tradeoffs
We begin by studying the tradeoff between the accuracy and the
overall individual unfairness of a given classifier (E2(b) in Eq. 5).
We use three standard classifier models: logistic regression, support
vector machine with RBF kernel (SVM), and random forest classifier.
Results in Section 4.1 and Section 4.2 are computed by optimizing
these classifiers for accuracy.
Each of the above models computes the likelihood of belonging to
the positive class for every instance. We denote this likelihood by pi
for an individual i . We compare the fairness and accuracy of these
classifiers with that of an “oracle” that can perfectly predict the
label for every instance (and assigns pi ∈ {0, 1}). To predict a label
in {0, 1} for individuals, we first rank all instances (in increasing
order) according to their pi values with ties broken randomly; then
we designate a decision ranking threshold 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1 and output a
label of 1 for individual i if and only if rank(i) ≥ nτ , where rank(i)
denotes the rank of individual i in the sorted list. In other words, an
increasing value of τ corresponds to the classifier rejecting more
people from the sorted list (in order of their positive class likelihood
pi ). As we vary τ , we expect both accuracy as well as unfairness of
the resulting predictions to change as discussed below and shown
in Figure 4.
For the oracle, as expected from Proposition 3.1, a perfect ac-
curacy corresponds to zero unfairness: with an increasing τ , the
accuracy increases while the unfairness decreases. After a certain
optimal value of threshold τ (close to 0.75 in the Adult data and
0.45 in the COMPAS data), the trend reverses. We note that 0.75
and 0.45 represent the fraction of instances in the negative class in
the respective datasets. Hence, at these optimal thresholds, all of
the oracle’s predictions are accurate (since the points are ranked
based on their positive class likelihood) resulting in 0 unfairness.
However, for all other (non-oracle) classifiers, as expected via
Proposition 3.2, the trend is very different: the optimal threshold for
(imperfect) accuracy is far from the optimal threshold for unfairness.
Moreover, with increasing τ , while unfairness continually increases,
for accuracy we initially see an increase followed by a drop. We
note that the overall unfairness is not always a monotone function
of the decision ranking threshold as illustrated in Example A.1.
4.2 Fairness Decomposability
As Figure 3 and Eq. 5 show, the individual unfairness of a pre-
dictor can be decomposed into between-group and within-group
unfairness. In this part, we study the between-group unfairness
component (E2β (b) in Eq. 5) as we change τ . To this end, we con-
sider two sensitive features: gender and race. We split each of the
datasets into all possible disjoint groups based on these sensitive
features (e.g., White women, Hispanic men, Black women).
Figure 5 shows between-group unfairness along with overall
unfairness for different values of τ . We notice that for the Adult
dataset, the between-group unfairness follows a multi-modal trend:
it starts from a non-zero value at τ = 0, falls to almost 0 for most
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Figure 4: Overall unfairness (solid lines—E2(b) in Eq. 5) and accuracy (dotted lines) as a function of the decision ranking threshold (τ ) for
various classifiers. The positive and negative class ratio in the Adult dataset is about 0.25 : 0.75, hence the 1.00 accuracy point corresponds to
τ = 0.75. Similarly, the positive and negative class ratio in the COMPAS dataset is about 0.55 : 0.45, hence the 1.00 accuracy point corresponds
to τ = 0.45. For oracle, the optimal point for accuracy corresponds to minimal unfairness; this doesn’t hold for other classifiers.
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Figure 5: Between-group unfairness (solid lines—E2β (b) in Eq. 5) and overall unfairness (dotted lines—E2(b) in Eq. 5) as a function of the deci-
sion ranking threshold (τ ) for various classifiers. Between-group unfairness E2β (b) only constitutes a small fraction of the overall unfairness
E2(b).
classifiers (except for the oracle) at around τ = 0.2, reaches a local
peak again around τ = 0.5, and finally completes another cycle to
fall and then reach its maximum value at τ = 1.0. The COMPAS
dataset also shows a similar trend, albeit to a lesser extent.
Between-group unfairness and overall unfairness. Compar-
ing the between-group unfairness and overall unfairness in Fig-
ure 5 reveals a very interesting insight: for the same value of τ , the
between-group unfairness (solid lines) is a very small fraction of
the overall unfairness (dotted lines). For example, considering the
performance of the logistic regression classifier on the COMPAS
dataset, the maximum value of the overall unfairness is close to
0.6 whereas the maximum value of the between-group unfairness
is merely 0.01. We hypothesize that since the number of sensitive
feature-based groups is much smaller than the number of all indi-
viduals in the dataset, the individual unfairness value dominates
the between-group unfairness.
To test this hypothesis, we experiment with the following setup:
We take the three sensitive features present in the COMPAS dataset,
namely gender, race and age, and form sensitive feature groups
based on all possible combinations of these features. For example,
groups formed based on gender would be men and women; groups
formed based on race would be Black, White and Hispanic; whereas
groups formed based on gender as well as race would be Black men,
Black women, White men and so on. For each of these sensitive
feature combinations we plot in Figure 6 the percentage of contri-
bution that the between-group unfairness has towards the overall
unfairness. Figure 6 shows that as the number of sensitive feature
groups increases, the between-group unfairness contributes more and
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Figure 6: Between-group unfairness (E2β (b) in Eq. 5) as a fraction
of the overall/individual unfairness (E2(b) in Eq. 5) for various com-
binations of sensitive features. Numbers on the x-axis denote how
many sensitive feature groups would be formedwhen using the cor-
responding sensitive feature set. Logistic regression, SVM and Ran-
dom Forests achieve similar accuracies of 66%, 67% and 65% as well
as similar overall individual unfairness of 0.145, 0.151 and 0.134 re-
spectively on the ProPublica Compas dataset.
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Figure 7: The effect of applying false negative rate constraints of Zafar et al. in order to minimize the between-group unfairness (E2β (b)).
The second plot shows that reducing the between-group unfairness leads to an increase in the within-group unfairness (E2ω (b)) for Whites.
Moreover, for certain values of the covariance threshold, the overall unfairness (E2(b)) increases as compared to the unconstrained classifier.
more towards the overall unfairness. This result is also in line with
the implications of Proposition 3.4.
Figure 6 also shows the following interesting insight: Even though
the overall unfairness and accuracy of all the classifiers is very sim-
ilar (cf. Figure 4), the random forest classifier leads of significantly
smaller contribution of between-group unfairness as compared to
other classifier (e.g., gender, gender+age). In other words even for
similar levels of accuracy and overall unfairness, classifiers have
very different between-group unfairness across different feature sets.
Accuracy and between-group unfairness. We also study the
between group unfairness in Figure 5 and corresponding accuracy
in Figure 4. We notice that there is no definitive correlation between
the accuracy and the between-group unfairness: In the Adult dataset,
the highest level of accuracy (around τ = 0.8) corresponds to one
of the lowest values of between-group unfairness for all classifiers.
However, this doesn’t hold in the case of COMPAS dataset.
4.3 Interaction Between Different Types of
Unfairness
In this section, we revisit the literature on fairness-aware machine
learning and investigate howmethods proposed to control between-
group unfairness (which is what most existing methods focus on
[13, 17, 20, 21, 40–42]) can affect the overall/individual and the
within-group unfairness. Specifically, we study how the overall
unfairness (E2(b) in Eq. 5) and the within-group unfairness (E2ω (b)
in Eq. 5) would change when training a constrained classifier to
minimize the between-group unfairness (E2β (b) in Eq. 5). Our study
is motivated by the fact that while several methods focus on de-
signing constraints to remove the between-group unfairness (e.g.,
see [17, 40, 42]), to the best of our knowledge, no prior work in
fairness-aware machine learning has studied the effect of these
constraints on the overall and the within-group unfairness.
To this end, we use the methodology proposed by Zafar et
al. [40] to remove the between-group unfairness based on false
negative rates between different races (Whites and non-Whites) in
the COMPAS dataset. Zafar et al. propose to remove the between-
group unfairness by bounding the covariance between misclas-
sification distance from the decision boundary and the sensitive
feature value. The method operates by bounding the covariance
of the unconstrained classifier by successive multiplicative factors
between 1 and 0. A covariance multiplicative factor of 1 means
that no fairness constraints are applied while training the classi-
fier, whereas a factor of 0 means the tightest possible constraints
are applied. As done by Zafar et al., we train several logistic re-
gression classifiers to limit the between-group unfairness; each
classifier is trained with a covariance multiplicative factor in the
range [1.00, 0.95, 0.90, . . . , 0.05, 0.00].
Figure 7 shows the between-group unfairness, within-group
unfairness, and overall/individual unfairness as the fairness con-
straints of Zafar et al. [40] are tightened towards 0. The figure shows
the following key insights: (i) Reducing the between-group unfair-
ness can in fact increase the within-group unfairness: the within-
group unfairness for Whites almost monotonically increases as
the between-group unfairness is reduced. This observation also
follows Proposition 3.3. (ii) Reducing the between-group unfairness
can exacerbate overall/individual unfairness: As the between-group
unfairness decreases between the covariance multiplicative factor
of 0.8 to 0.6 (on the x-axis), the overall unfairness in fact goes up.
These insights point to possible significant tensions between these
different components of unfairness.
Summary of empirical analysis. Experiments on multiple real-
world datasets performed in this section support the theoretical
analysis of Section 3. The empirical (as well as the theoretical) anal-
ysis brings out the inherent tensions between fairness and accuracy,
as well as between different (between- and within-group) compo-
nents of fairness. These results point to potential for situations
where optimizing for one type of fairness can exacerbate the other.
5 CONCLUSION
We proposed using inequality indices from economics as a princi-
pled way to compute the scalar degree of total unfairness of any
algorithmic decision system. The approach is based onwell-justified
principles (axioms), and is general enough so that by varying the
benefit function, we can capture all previous notions of algorithmic
fairness conditions as special cases, while also admitting interesting
generalizations. The resulting measures of total unfairness unify
previous concepts of group and individual fairness, and allow us
to study quantitatively the behavior of earlier methods to miti-
gate unfairness. These earlier methods typically worry only about
between-group unfairness, which may be justified for legal reasons,
or in order to redress particular social prejudices. However, we
demonstrate that minimizing exclusively between-group unfair-
ness may actually increase overall unfairness.
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A APPENDIX: TECHNICAL MATERIAL
Proof of Proposition 3.1. If there exists a classifierθ ′withLD (θ ′) =
0, then that classifier minimizes I : For all i = 1, · · · ,n, the benefit
i receives under θ ′, denoted by bθ ′i , is equal to 1 + θ
′(xi ) − yi = 1.
That is everyone gets the same benefit under θ ′, and as the result,
I (bθ ′) = I (1) = 0.
If there exists a classifier θ with I (bθ ) = 0, θ must assign the
same benefit to everyone: there exists b ∈ {0, 1, 2} such that for all
i = 1, · · · ,n, bθi = 1 + θ (xi ) − yi = b. Now let θ ′(x) = θ (x) + 1 − b.
It is easy to verify that θ ′ has zero error (i.e. LD (θ ′) = 0). □
Proof of Proposition 3.2. Let p = P(x,y)∼P [y = 1|x = x˜] so that
0 < p < 0.5. We know that the Bayes/accuracy optimal classifier
assigns label 0 to every instance i with xi = x˜. Suppose D consists
of n instances all with xi = x˜. Given the population invariance
property of I , n can be arbitrarily large without affecting the value
of I (.). Therefore we instead reason about the limiting case where
n = ∞. In this case, we expect exactly p fraction of the instances
to have y = 1 and the other (1 − p) fraction to have y = 0. The
benefit distribution bA for θA, therefore, consists of p fraction of
the population receiving benefit 0 and the other (1 − p) fraction
receiving 1.
Now consider a probabilistic classifier θq that randomly assigns
label 1 to each instance in D with probability q ∈ (0, 1). The result-
ing benefit distribution bq of θq is as follows: p(1 − q) fraction of
the population receive benefit 0; pq + (1 − p)(1 − q) faction receive
benefit 1; and (1 − p)q faction receive benefit 2.
We claim that for q = (1 − p), ID (θA) > ID (θq ). To see this,
note that bq can be constructed from bA via a series of inequality-
reducing operations:
(1) b′ = 2×bA, so that b′ consists of p fraction of the population
receiving benefit 0 and the other (1 − p) fraction receiving 2.
Due to the scale invariance property of I , we know I (b′) =
I (bA).
(2) Perform the following progressive transfer on b′ to obtain
b′′: Take one unit of benefit from p(1 − p) fraction of the
population whose benefit is 2, and give it to p(1−p) fraction
with benefit 0. The resulting distribution, b′′, consists of p2
faction with benefit 0; 2p(1 − p) faction with benefit 1; and
(1 − p)2 faction with benefit 2. Because I satisfies the Dalton
principle and p(1 − p) > 0, we have that I (b′′) < I (b′).
Combining the above two, we have I (b′′) < I (bA). It only remains
to note that b′′ is precisely bq forq = (1−p). Therefore, we conclude
I (b′′) = I (b(1−p)) < I (bA). This finishes the proof. □
The following example shows that the accuracy of the fairness
optimal classifier can be arbitrarily bad compared to that of the
accuracy optimal classifier.
Example A.1. Consider the example in the proof of Proposi-
tion 3.2. Let I be the generalized entropy with α = 2. We claim that
the fairness optimal classifier is one that assigns label 1 to every
instance. To see this, recall that under θq , p(1 − q) fraction of the
population receive benefit 0; pq + (1 − p)(1 − q) faction receive
benefit 1; and (1−p)q faction receive benefit 2. So the mean benefit
µ is equal to 1 − p + q. Taking derivative with respect to q, we have
d
dq
(
(pq + (1 − p)(1 − q))
(
1
1 − p + q
)2
+ (1 − p)q
(
2
1 − p + q
)2)
= 0
⇒ q∗ = 1 − 3p + 2p
2
3 − 2p
The derivative is positive for q < q∗ and negative for q > q∗. The
minimum therefore happens at either q = 0 or q = 1. Given that for
0 < p < 1, 11−p >
4−3p
(2−p)2 , we obtain that q = 1 minimizes I .
The fairness optimal classifier assigns label 1 to every instance
resulting in accuracy p, whereas the accuracy optimal classifier can
achieve accuracy (1 − p). The ratio 1−pp can be arbitrarily large if p
is taken to be sufficiently small.
Proof of Proposition 3.3. Note that because of the optimality of θ∗β
for (4), if Iβ (θ∗β ) , Iβ (θ∗), it must be the case that Iβ (θ∗β ) < Iβ (θ∗).
If I (θ∗β ) ≤ I (θ∗), then θ∗β is an optimal solution to (3), and Iβ (θ∗β ) <
Iβ (θ∗). This is a contradiction with the choice of θ∗. If Iω (θ∗β ) ≤
Iω (θ∗), then combined with the fact that Iβ (θ∗β ) < Iβ (θ∗), we have
that I (θ∗β ) < I (θ∗), which is a contradiction with the optimality of
θ∗ for (3). □
Proof of Proposition 3.4. Suppose |G | = m and |G ′ | = m′. Let
b =
(
b(д1,д′1), · · · , b(дm,д′m′ )
)
where b(дi ,д
′
j ) specifies the benefit
distribution for individuals in group (дi ,д′j ) and µ(дi ,д
′
j ) specifies
the distribution in which each individual in (дi ,д′j ) receives the
group’s mean benefit. Note that IG×G′β (b) can be written as
I
(
µ(д1,д′1), · · · , µ(дm,д′m′ )
)
= IGβ
(
µ(д1,д′1), · · · , µ(дm,д′m′ )
)
+ IGω
(
µ(д1,д′1), · · · , µ(дm,д′m′ )
)
= I
(
µд1 , · · · , µдm ) + IGω (µ(д1,д′1), · · · , µ(дm,д′m′ ))
≥ I (µд1 , · · · , µдm )
= IGβ (b)
where to obtain the second line, we used the additive decompos-
ability property of I ; for the third line we used the definition of the
between-group component, and finally to obtain the conclusion,
we used the zero-normalization property of I . □
Proof of Proposition 3.5. Recall that I (b) = IGβ (b) + IGω (b) and
IGβ (b), IGω (b) ≥ 0. Therefore, we have 0 ≤
IGβ (b)
I (b) ≤ 1.
Consider a benefit distribution b in which members of group
д1 ∈ G receive benefit 1, and everyone else receives benefit 0. It is
easy to see that for this distribution
IGβ (b)
I (b) = 1. Similarly, consider
a benefit distribution b′ that assigns a benefit of 1 to half of the
population in each group, and 0 to everyone else. It is easy to that
IGβ (b′)
I (b′) = 0. □
The following example shows that an added feature may in fact
worsen the unfairness of the accuracy optimal classifier.
Example A.2. Let I (.) be the generalized entropy with α = 2.
Suppose for all xi = x˜, p = P(x,y)∼D [y = 1|x = x˜] > 0.5, so θA
assigns label 1 to every instance with xi = x˜. So in the resulting
benefit distribution, p fraction of the population receives benefit
1 and the other (1 − p) fraction receives 2. The mean benefit is,
therefore, (2 − p) and GE is equal to8
p
(
1
2 − p
)2
+ (1 − p)
(
2
2 − p
)2
=
4 − 3p
(2 − p)2 .
Supposewith the addition of a new binary feature, the population
breaks down into two subpopulations, one corresponding to x =
(x˜, 0) and the other corresponding to x = (x˜, 1). Let r1−r be the
relative size of the former sub-population to the latter (0 ≤ r ≤ 1).
We would like the accuracy optimal classifier to be different for
each subpopulation, so for now let’s assume:
• P(x,y)∼D [y = 1∧ x = (x˜, 0)] = r2 − ϵ , so θA assigns label 0 to
every instance with x = (x˜, 0)—this is because r2 − ϵ < 12r .
• P(x,y)∼D [y = 1 ∧ x = (x˜, 1)] = p − r2 + ϵ , so θA assigns
label 1 to every instance with x = (x˜, 1)—this is because
p − r2 + ϵ > 12 (1 − r ).
In the resulting benefit distribution, r2 − ϵ fraction of the total
population receives benefit 0, p + 2ϵ fraction of the total population
receives benefit 1, and the other (1 − p − r2 − ϵ) fraction receives
benefit 2. The mean benefit is, therefore, (2−p − r ) and GE is equal
to
(p + 2ϵ )
(
1
2 − p − r
)2
+ (1 − p − r2 − ϵ )
(
2
2 − p − r
)2
=
4 − 3p − 2r − 2ϵ
(2 − p − r )2 .
Take p = 0.9, r = 0.2 and ϵ = 0.001, and we have:
4 − 3p
(2 − p)2 = 1.075
4 − 3p − 2r − 2ϵ
(2 − p − r )2 = 1.10
The above shows the addition of a new feature can worsen the
fairness of the accuracy optimal classifier.
8We are dropping the constants from the definition of the inequality index, as they
don’t affect the comparison.
